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LAWYERS, CITIZENS, AND THE INTERNAL
POINT OF VIEW
W. Bradley Wendel*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two citizens, who we will call "good" and "bad" for
convenience. The good citizen looks to the law for guidance, and regards
legal directives as reasons for action, apart from any consideration of
whether he will be punished for failing to comply with the law. The bad
citizen, by contrast, obeys the law only out of self-interest-because he or
she would rather not suffer the sanctions that the state is prepared to dole
out for flouting the law. The bad citizen's concern with the law is no
different from the reasons that she would have for giving money to a
mugger. Perhaps the use of "bad" is misleading; it is enough that the bad
citizen is "disinclined to obey stupid laws just because they are the law."'
In any event, the two citizens differ in respect of the attitudes they take
toward the law. The good citizen regards the law as a source of reasons,
while the bad citizen's reasons are essentially unaltered by the law, except
insofar as the law is another source of unpleasant consequences like being
deprived of liberty or property. 2 In the jurisprudential terms pioneered by
H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, the good and bad citizens differ in
regard to the perspective from which they view the law. 3 The bad citizen
regards the law as something like a force of nature, which can be studied
and hopefully avoided, but which does not alter the citizen's practical
reasoning. Our hypothetical bad citizen is already concerned with avoiding
harm, and the law presents merely another kind of harm to be avoided. The
practical reasoning of the good citizen, by contrast, is altered in a different
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks for helpful comments and probing questions
are due to Greg Cooper, Mark Drumbl, David Luban, David McGowan, Jane Stapleton,
Chris Whelan, David Zaring, Ben Zipursky, participants in the Fordham Symposium The
Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics, and participants in faculty workshops at the
Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences, University of San Diego
School of Law, Villanova Law School, and Washington and Lee Law School.
1. See Frederick Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 Can. J. Phil. 495, 500 (1994) (reviewing
Roger Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought (1992)).
2. The "bad" label is due to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who gave a definition of law
in terms of a prediction about how legal officials might decide particular cases, as viewed by
a citizen who is interested only in avoiding legal penalties that might attach to his conduct.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-62,(1897).
3. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 89 (2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing internal and
external points of view).
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way by the law, because she regards it as a reason for action that did not
exist independently. From her "internal point of view," the good citizen
accepts the law as creating new, justified demands.
Hart's great insight is that theories of law framed exclusively from the
point of view of the bad citizen are inadequate to capture an essential
feature of law-its normativity. Law creates reasons for action that are
acknowledged by citizens using the language of obligation, such as
"ought," "must," "should," "right," and "wrong."4 The idea of the good
citizen and the internal point of view is intended to personify the
perspective of someone who follows the law for non-prudential reasons. 5
Hart not only demonstrates the possibility of the internal point of view, but
shows that in order for there to be a legal system, it is conceptually
necessary that certain officials (namely, judges) regard the law from the
internal point of view when deliberating. 6 If judges did not acknowledge
legal norms as legitimate reasons for action (indicating this by the use of
words like "ought," "right," and so on), then there would be no way to
differentiate an authoritative legal command from the demand of a mugger.
Significantly, however, in his focus on the perspective judges must take
toward the law, Hart says relatively little about the perspective citizens
must take. It is clear, on Hart's account, that citizens may take the internal
point of view, but he does not argue that they must. Indeed, he admits that
"private citizens... may obey each 'for his part only' and from any motive
whatever." 7  A society in which only judges accept the law from the
internal point of view might be "deplorably sheeplike," 8 but there is no
conceptual reason why a society composed predominantly of bad citizens
or passive, sheeplike subjects could not be said to have a legal system.
I think there may be more than Hart acknowledges to a conceptual
argument for the necessity of citizens taking the internal perspective toward
law. It is inherent in the concept of acting lawfully that one acts for reasons
that are general and apply to all similarly situated citizens. If a person is
concerned merely to act and to avoid sanctions, then she may adopt any
attitude whatsoever toward the law, but she cannot claim to have acted
lawfully without accepting the law from the internal perspective. Legality
as an explanatory or justificatory concept simply drops out of the picture
unless one regards the law from the internal point of view.9 From a purely
external, bad-person point of view, someone may say, "Gee, look at that-I
managed to avoid being thrown in jail," but from that perspective it is
incoherent to say, "I acted lawfully." The linchpin of the conceptual
4. Id. at 57.
5. See Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 51 (3d ed. 2003).
6. Hart, supra note 3, at 116.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 117.
9. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 637, 648; see also Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance
with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1268 & n.7 (1998) (citing
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523 (1984)).
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argument is the purpose for which a citizen engages with the law.' 0 She
may be interested only in describing and predicting certain patterns of
behavior among fellow citizens, in which case it is perfectly appropriate to
take an external perspective on the law. If she is interested in acting
lawfully, however, her practical reasoning necessarily proceeds from the
internal perspective." The internal perspective is mandated by the
conjunction of action, as opposed to observation (for which an external
perspective would be adequate), and the evaluation that an action is lawful,
as opposed to merely something that one can get away with. If this
relationship holds, then acting under law while regarding the law from an
external point of view would be on par, normatively speaking, with robbing
a bank and successfully asserting an alibi defense, or bribing a prosecutor to
drop charges. The actor would have managed to avoid sanctions, but the
evaluation of the action would be that it was wrong from the standpoint of a
relevant normative framework. Indeed, part of my argument here is that the
normativity of law is not distinctive, but is similar to the normativity of any
other social practice which is constituted and regulated by rules or other
standards internal to the practice. ' 2
Regardless of whether that position succeeds as a conceptual matter,
however, there are normative arguments that citizens ought to accept the
law from the internal point of view, even if they could in theory refuse to do
so. Perhaps a society of Holmesian bad men can exist, but it would be a
lousy one, and one which we have good reason to hope will not materialize.
If everyone approached the law as a Holmesian bad man, it would be
impossible to use the law to coordinate the activities of people who do not
share substantive moral conceptions of the good, and to realize the benefits
of cooperative social activity. Lawyers, in particular, have an obligation to
maintain the integrity of the legal system and preserve its ability to secure
the benefits of peace and the stability of mutual expectations. 13 These
social goods depend to a large extent on people approaching the law as
10. Here I follow Neil MacCormick, who would require citizens to regard the law from
the internal point of view, at least for certain purposes:
The method of observation of conduct from that point of view, however useful it
might be for certain scientific purposes, including at least some varieties of
sociological inquiry, is inadequate to capture those concepts of lawyers and of
laymen which are bound up with rules and standards of conduct.
Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart 37 (1981) (emphasis added).
11. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 154 (1979)
(differentiating external statements about law, which are "statements about people's
practices and actions, attitudes and beliefs concerning the law," from internal statements
which are used "as a standard by which to evaluate, guide, or criticize behaviour").
12. Lon Fuller makes a similar point, in defending his conception of the "internal
morality of the law," where he notes that the natural law regulating "the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules" is really no different from the natural
law of carpentry, as perceived by a carpenter who is interested in a building not falling
down. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 96 (1964).
13. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185 (2003); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a
Public Calling, 49 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1990).
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good citizens, and it is only a slight exaggeration to predict that "if people
routinely start running red lights when they think no cop is watching (or
hire lawyers to keep a lookout for the cops, and to exhaust the resources of
traffic courts arguing the lights were green), the regime will collapse.' 4
The social good represented by law-its capacity to provide a framework
for cooperative action despite deep and persistent disagreement-would be
undermined if lawyers refused to regard the law as something worthy of
being taken seriously, interpreted in good faith with due regard to its
meaning, and not simply seen as an obstacle standing in the way of the
client's goals. 15
For this reason, although it may be conceptually possible to imagine a
profession of Holmesian bad men, it would not be the sort of profession that
a pluralistic democracy would tolerate. One of the great achievements of
law is its capacity to settle normative conflict by providing reasons for
action that are accepted as such, without regard to whether they overlap
with a citizen's first-order moral beliefs, and apart from the question of
whether a violator will be caught and punished. I therefore claim in this
essay that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between Hart's theory
of the nature of law and a theory of legal ethics that emphasizes the role of
lawyers as custodians of the law. The internal point of view is conceptually
or normatively mandatory for lawyers and citizens when purporting to act
lawfully; moreover, the internal point of view has implications for the
interpretation of legal texts, and rules out certain kinds of manipulation by
lawyers of legal norms solely for the benefit of their clients. In order to
make these connections explicit, however, it is first necessary to look
briefly at Hart's notion of the internal perspective.
I. HART'S CONCEPT OF THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW
When one is acting as a scientific observer of a group, it may make sense
for certain purposes (such as making predictions) only to record regularities
in behavior.' 6 However, the observer will miss a crucial dimension to that
behavior if she attempts to explain the behavior exclusively in terms of
regularities. 17 In particular, the observer cannot give an explanation in
terms of following rules or norms, or normative notions like duties and
obligations.18 That is, it is impossible to account for the first-person
14. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye
Scholer, 23 L. & Soc. Inquiry 315, 321 (1998).
15. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167
(2005).
16. See Stephen R. Perry, Hart's Methodological Positivism, in Hart's Postscript:
Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law 311, 313 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Hart's Postscript].
17. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 36.
18. Hart, supra note 3, at 89 ("If... the observer really keeps austerely to this extreme
external point of view and does not give any account of the manner in which members of the
group who accept the rules view their own regular behaviour, his description of their life
1476 [Vol. 75
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phenomenology of participating in a social practice. Of course, it may be
the case that observed regularities are merely a happenstance; but it also
may be the case that people converge on certain actions because they
believe that they ought to. The shared belief of participants in a practice
that the regulative standards of that practice are obligatory differentiates
mere behavioral regularities from rule-governed (or at least norm-governed)
behavior. Deviation from a habit is a matter of indifference, but deviation
from a norm is an occasion for criticism that is regarded as justified.19
Hart's concept of the internal point of view is meant to capture the
perspective of a participant in a practice who takes the practical attitude of
acceptance toward the practice's norms. 20
Significantly, criticism from the internal point of view need not be based
in morality-norms of etiquette, religious observance, and the rules of
games are all a basis for a negative evaluation, either by an observer or by
the actor, in a self-critical stance. The unifying concept here is not
morality, but normativity-to participate in certain social practices entails
accepting the authority of regulative standards as guides to behavior, and
accepting the legitimacy of criticism based on those standards. These
regulative standards are not arbitrary, but have their origin in some ultimate
state of affairs or value that is the aim of the social practice of which they
are a part. 21 Normativity is therefore explained in teleological terms, with
the norms governing a social practice being justified in terms of the ends for
which the practice is constituted.22 Rules of a game are justified in terms of
making the game challenging, fair, and interesting; rules of etiquette are
intended to show respect, regulate social interaction, and so on. The end or
purpose of a practice gives rise to what may be called the immanent
rationality of some domain of intentional action.23 The content of standards
regulating the activities of practitioners is not arbitrary, but is given by the
purpose shared by participants in the practice. 24
cannot be in terms of rules at all, and so not in the terms of the rule-dependent notions of
obligation or duty.").
19. Id. at 55-56, 84; MacCormick, supra note 10, at 31.
20. See Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157
(2006).
21. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 34 (citing John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights (1980)).
22. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955) (defending the
practice conception of rules). In the Postscript to the Second Edition of The Concept of Law,
Hart explains the internal/external distinction with reference to the practice theory of rules.
See Hart, supra note 3, at 254-55. This connection is unsurprising since Hart and Rawls
worked together at Harvard and Oxford around the time when Rawls wrote this paper. See
Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream 169 (2004).
23. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 204-31 (1995) (arguing that
interpretation ought to look to whatever rationality is immanent in a particular mode of
ordering).
24. It is an important feature of the Rawlsian practice theory of rules that the practice as
a whole is justified on the basis of some end or value; otherwise, it is vulnerable to Raz's
argument that practices as such are not a reason for action. See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason
and Norms 56-57 (1975). In the case of games and etiquette, the justification is not moral,
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The authority of those standards over practitioners is in turn justified by
the volitional act of entering into the practice. 25 From the point of view of
practitioners, it would be a conceptual error to regard the norms of a
practice from a detached, quasi-scientific perspective, because to participate
in a practice means to aim at the end for which the practice is constituted.
Doing this requires conformity to the internal regulative standards of the
practice. Imagine a person who claimed to be playing basketball, agreed
that other players conformed to an apparent standard prohibiting double
dribbling, but refused for his own part to accept the authority of the double
dribble rule. That player would be regarded as making either an annoying
joke or an argument that the game would be more interesting if double
dribbling were allowed.26 In no event, however, would the player be
engaging in the practice of playing basketball. The game of basketball can
exist only if all of the players are respecting the standards that literally
create the game and make it possible. If players regarded the rules as
merely predictions of what other players would do, or as defeasible
presumptions to be ignored when it was convenient, the "game" would
collapse, leaving only an unstructured, meaningless spectacle of people
running around a room throwing a ball. There are plenty of meaningless
activities, but we expect to find participants in certain social practices acting
out of some sense that what they are doing is meaningful, and guided by the
overall sense or internal logic of the practice.27 Otherwise their actions are
literally unintelligible. Social practices exhibit what John Searle calls
"collective intentionality," the idea that it is possible for a person to do
something only as part of a larger enterprise in which people act
collectively, toward some common end. 28 In these practices, the very
possibility of taking certain types of actions is created by rules which
regulate conduct, which Searle calls "constitutive rules," because they
literally make up and create the possibility of a new form of activity. 29
but it is still teleological. Thus, the explanation of the normativity of the rules regulating
these practices is that following the rules is necessary in order for people to jointly
accomplish the ends of the practice.
25. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 190 (2d ed. 1984) ("To enter into a practice is
to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as
judged by them."); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 Phil. Rev. 327,
329-31 (1992) (arguing that shared cooperative activity is possible only if the participants
are committed to the joint activity).
26. See Rawls, supra note 22, at 25-26 (arguing that it does not make sense to regard
oneself as acting within a practice while at the same time refusing to accept the regulative
standards of the practice).
27. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 47 (1986) (arguing that a participant in a social
practice does not regard the practice and its constitutive rules as simply given, but assumes it
has some value, in the sense of serving some interest or purpose); Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart
and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. Rev. 167, 176 (1999) (arguing that
"actions within social practices ... are done with intention and purpose").
28. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 23 (1995).
29. Id. at 27, 43-44.
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Searle gives the example of the social institution of money, which is
created by a system of norms governing its use. Without understanding and
accepting a rule recognizing that little green pieces of paper printed by the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing constitute a medium of exchange, there
would be no way to make sense of even a very simple transaction, like
buying a hamburger. The action could be described--"Person A hands
Person B a little green piece of paper, and receives a hamburger in
return"-but the description would miss all of the facts about the intentions
of Person A and Person B that give meaning to the event. It follows from
this conception of practices that a participant in a practice is subject to the
justified criticism of others if she refuses to respect it as a purposive
enterprise. 30 Thus, our hypothetical judge who approached judging as a
game only, and refused to respect legal rules as legitimate, would be
engaging in the same kind of bizarre behavior as a person who refused to
believe that little green pieces of paper had value. Similarly, a hypothetical
citizen who approached the law as a meaningless activity would simply not
be participating in the practice. She would be like someone who handed
red pieces of paper to the counter attendant and expected a hamburger in
return. Acting lawfully, as opposed to acting simpliciter, means being
oriented toward the law as a purposive, meaningful activity.
Participation in a meaningful social practice is also the key to Hart's
distinction between acting out of obligation and acting because one feels
obliged. 31 Giving up one's wallet at gunpoint reveals a sense of being
obliged to act, for fear of experiencing the consequences of inaction. When
someone acts out of obligation, by contrast, the explanation of the person's
action makes reference to normative standards, not merely the desire to
avoid harm. Although Hart does not rely solely on linguistic intuitions,32
he does point out that we use the language of obligation, including terms
like "must," "ought," and "right," to characterize the reasons we have for
following the law. This usage indicates that people often believe
themselves to be acting under the guidance of legal norms. Having said
this, Hart is careful not to say that facts about a person's beliefs and
motivations are necessary to warrant the truth of a statement that the person
had an obligation to do such-and-such. As he observes, "The internal
30. Compare the exchange between the experienced catcher Crash Davis and the young,
wild pitcher Ebbie Calvin "Nuke" LaLoosh in Bull. Durham:
Nuke: How come you don't like me?
Crash: Because you don't respect yourself, which is your problem. But you don't
respect the game, and that's my problem.
Bull Durham (MGM Pictures 1988).
31. See Hart, supra note 3, at 82-83, 88-89; Bix, supra note 27, at 174-75 (explaining
this distinction); see also Kevin Toh, Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11
Legal Theory 75, 83 (2005) (interpreting Hart as arguing that "where a person makes a
judgment that a law exists, he considers some action nonoptional or obligatory").
32. For the influence on Hart of "the linguistic turn" in philosophy developed at Oxford
(by Ryle, J.L. Austin, and others) and Cambridge (by Wittgenstein and his followers) in the
mid-twentieth century, see Lacey, supra note 22, at 132-47; MacCormick, supra note 10, at
12-19.
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aspect of rules is often misrepresented as a mere matter of 'feelings' in
contrast to externally observable physical behaviour." 33 A person may not
in fact feel any compulsion whatsoever to act in accordance with a norm,
but the norm is still obligatory. Its binding nature or normativity is not
contingent upon what a particular agent actually believes, but is a function
of what a persbn would believe if she were appropriately oriented toward
the domain and its regulative standards.
This is a somewhat tricky position to maintain, and leads Hart into
ambiguity. 34 For although he states that the internal attitude is not a matter
of feelings, he insists that accepting a rule requires recognition that the rule
states a standard to be followed by the relevant group as a whole:
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to
certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should
display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for
conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are
justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative
terminology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong'. 35
Hart seems to be saying that a critical reflective attitude is necessary for
something to be a rule, but that any individual subject to the rule may not
feel obliged to follow it.36 As Neil MacCormick understands this passage,
Hart defines the internal point of view "by reference to those who have and
act upon a wish or preference for conduct in accordance with a given
pattern, both in their own conduct and in relation to those others to whom
they deem it applicable." 37  This ambiguity between the conceptual
necessity of a critical reflective attitude and the contingency of any given
agent having that attitude will be important later in this essay, where we
turn to the question of whether citizens and lawyers must accept legal rules
as legitimate.
It may be helpful at this point to introduce the concept of "detached"
normative statements in order to differentiate the cognitive and volitional
aspects of the internal point of view.38 The utterance of a detached
normative statement does not commit the speaker to the normative force it
expresses. Detached normative statements reveal that it is possible for an
observer of a group to understand what it would be like to be a member of
the group, without necessarily sharing in the commitments of the individual
members. To do so, one would share the cognitive aspect of the internal
33. Hart, supra note 3, at 57; see also id. at 83 ("[F]acts about beliefs and motives ...
are not necessary for the truth of a statement that a person had an obligation to do
something.").
34. See Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System 148 n.3 (1970) (distinguishing three
different senses of the concept of an internal point of view).
35. Hart, supra note 3, at 57.
36. See Shiner, supra note 1, at 58-59.
37. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 34.
38. See Raz, supra note 11, at 153-57; Raz, supra note 24, at 175-77; Perry, supra note
16, at 327.
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point of view, and appreciate the volitional dimension, but not share or
endorse the volitional dimension of preferring it as a standard for herself.
MacCormick and Joseph Raz offer similar examples: a non-Catholic who
says to his Catholic friend, "You ought to go to Mass today, '39 or a meat-
eater who says to his vegetarian friend, "You should not eat this dish. It
contains meat."'40 These detached normative statements are made from
what may be called the hermeneutic point of view, 41 the perspective of a
sympathetic observer who is concerned with understanding behavior, but
not participating in the practice under study.
Raz suggests that lawyers and law professors characteristically take the
hermeneutic point of view when they make statements about the law. 42
Crucially, this perspective enables observers to render morally neutral
descriptions of what the law is-that is, to give a methodologically
positivist theory of law.43, A law professor elucidating the content of the
law respecting such-and-such an activity need not commit herself to the
view that the conduct required by the law ought to be brought about, as long
as she does (cognitively) appreciate that a participant in the law-governed
activity does accept the normativity of the applicable law. As Hart draws
this distinction,
It is true that... the descriptive legal theorist must understand what it is
to adopt the internal point of view and in that limited sense he must be
able to put himself in the place of an insider; but this is not to accept the
law or share or endorse the insider's internal point of view or in any other
way to surrender his descriptive stance.44
Judges, on the other hand, must adopt the internal point of view at least
toward secondary rules, particularly the rule of recognition.45  This is
necessary for a legal system to exist, as opposed to there being a merely
fortuitous convergence of behavior by people who happen to be wearing
black robes. Judges cannot take the detached point of view, but must adopt
an attitude of commitment or acceptance of the rules imposing duties on
them qua judges.
39. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 38-39.
40. Raz, supra note 24, at 175.
41. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 38; see Shiner, supra note 1, at 60, 65.
42. Raz, supra note 11, at 156.
43. Perry, supra note 16, at 326-27.
44. Hart, supra note 3, at 242.
45. See id. at 116 ("[I]f [the rule of recognition] is to exist at all, [it] must be regarded
from the internal point of view as a public, common standard of correct judicial decision,
and not as something which each judge merely obeys for his part only."); see also
MacCormick, supra note 10, at 22 ("[F]or [the rule of recognition] itself to exist, it is
necessary that the officials at least observe it as a binding social rule."); Bix, supra note 27,
at 177 ("Hart does not claim that (all or most) citizens taking an internal perspective on the
rules is a precondition to the existence of a legal system."); Jules Coleman,
Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in Hart's Postscript,
supra note 16, at 99, 110-11.
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To see Hart's point about the systematicity of official decisions, imagine
some kind of strange hypothetical society in which disputes are resolved by
the whim of decision makers, but as it happens the class of decision makers
is remarkably homogeneous, in terms of socioeconomic background,
ideology, education and training, and other determinants of beliefs and
preferences. If these decision makers consistently favored certain
litigants-say, prosecutors or big corporations-there would be an
observable regularity in their decisions, but we would not call those
decisions lawful unless they were justified by reasons that made reference
to the sorts of values that should make a difference in how legal disputes
are resolved. 46 The system would deserve the label "legal" only if the
officials regarded themselves as duty-bound to make decisions on the basis
of certain reasons and not others. We may disagree in some particulars over
what criteria differentiate a lawful decision from one based on whim or
partiality. At a minimum, a law-governed decision is one that is based on
standards that are objective and impersonal in that they are generally
applicable to similarly situated parties. 47 One may favor adding additional
criteria, such as clarity, prospectivity, stability, and the capability of
subjects to comply with official directives, 48 or may favor even thicker
standards, such as coherence with the community's political morality.49
But in any event, if we are to speak intelligibly of legality and legitimacy,
there must be some criteria for distinguishing between actions that respect a
regime of law and those that are responsive to other sorts of concerns. 50 In
Hart's jurisprudence, these criteria are provided by the system's rule of
recognition. 51
To say that judges must apply the criteria contained in the rule of
recognition is to say that a judge manifests her commitment to abide by the
norms of the social practice of 'law-governed decision making. Again,
however, it is important to be careful not to conflate this point about
obligation with claims about the beliefs or motivations of judges. As Hart
46. Joseph Raz would call these "dependent" reasons. A dependent reason is one that is
based on reasons that already apply to the subject of a directive. In Raz's example, if two
people refer a dispute to an arbitrator, the arbitrator's decision is supposed to reflect and be
based upon the reasons put forward by the disputing parties. See Joseph Raz, The Morality
of Freedom 41 (1986) [hereinafter, Raz, Morality of Freedom]; Joseph Raz, Authority, Law,
and Morality, in Ethics in the Public Domain 194, 212 (1994).
47. See, e.g., E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 262
(1975) ("[P]eople are not as stupid as some structuralist philosophers suppose them to be.
They will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a wig. It is inherent in the especial
character of law, as a body of rules and procedures, that it shall apply logical criteria with
reference to standards of universality and equity.").
48. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 12, at 39-94. For an interesting observation about the
relationship between Fuller's position and modem theorizing about the rule of law, see
Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 865 (2006) (reviewing Lacey,
supra note 22).
49. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
50. See Raz, supra note 11, at 79 (noting that talking in terms of a legal system requires
that there be criteria for determining which laws are part of the system and which are not).
51. Hart, supra note 3, at 100-01.
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emphasizes, "facts about beliefs and motives[] are not necessary for the
truth of a statement that a person had an obligation to do something. ' 52 A
judge may be motivated by the desire to be promoted to a higher court, to
win glory, or simply to continue in employment in a cushy job. Whatever
specific motivations a judge may have, however, there must be something
distinctive about law that provides a different sort of reason for action-
otherwise there would be no such thing as a legal system as opposed to a
fortuitous convergence of behavior by a bunch of people sitting on high
benches wearing black robes. 53 As long as the law makes a practical
difference to how a judge decides cases, in the sense that the judge accepts
the legitimacy of measuring her own conduct against the standard of
lawfulness articulated by the relevant community, the specific motivation a
person has for being a judge is immaterial. The only important thing is that
judges view their responsibilities from the internal perspective-that is, that
they see themselves as participants in an institution resting on acceptance,
not as gunmen writ large. 54
II. THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW FOR CITIZENS
In contrast to the situation of judges, Hart concludes that citizens need
not take the internal point of view with respect to rules which create duties,
obligations, or confer power to alter the legal landscape (such as rules
governing contracts or wills).5 5 Perhaps there can be a society in which
52. Id. at 83. Although philosophers influenced by Hume assume that reasons for action
must be based on the agent's desires-and, thus, that obligation and motivation are tightly
connected-many have questioned the conceptual linkage between reasons and desires. See,
e.g., Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason (1983); Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (1999);
T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998); Philippa Foot, Does Moral Subjectivism
Rest on a Mistake?, 15 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1995). Acting on antecedent desires may be
a part of practical rationality, but other reasons for action may be given by, for example,
recognition of injustice. The explanation of an action need not "bottom out" on some kind
of psychological urge; rather, the beginning of a chain of justification of an action (or an
ought-statement) may be the recognition of a good or value in some goal or state of affairs.
"Recognition of a reason gives the rational person a goal; and this recognition is . .. based
on facts and concepts not on some prior attitude, feeling or goal." Foot, supra at 13.
Moreover, one might make a kind of pragmatic argument for distinguishing adequate reason
and the agent's motivation. A person's motivations may not track obligations for a variety
of reasons, including weakness of will, conflicting desires, or apathy, but if it were not
possible to conclude that someone has an obligation apart from her motivational state, then
there would be no way to criticize a motivational state as inadequate. See Elizabeth
Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 102 (1993).
53. See Hart, supra note 3, at 116.
54. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Obedience, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 732, 736-37 (1985)
(reviewing Philip Soper, A Theory of Law (1984)).
55. See Hart, supra note 3, at 116 ("[P]rivate citizens... may obey each 'for his part
only' and from any motive whatever; though in a healthy society they will in fact often
accept these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to obey
them."); see also Kenneth Einar Himma, Law's Claim of Legitimate Authority, in Hart's
Postscript, supra note 16, at 271, 286 ("While legal normativity requires that officials take
the internal point of view towards the rule of recognition, it does not require that citizens do
so."); Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in The Path of
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there exist some good citizens and some bad ones, in the sense we have
been using "good" and "bad," and the society can still be one that is law-
governed, as long as officials adopt the internal point of view when
pronouncing on legal norms. Hart does state that citizens may take the
internal perspective on the law, and criticizes simple, Austinian positivist
theories as well as American legal realism for not having the conceptual
resources to account for the internal point of view. 56 It may be the case,
however, that Hart stopped short of where his theory would logically end
up, and that there are good reasons to require citizens to regard the law
from the internal point of view, at least insofar as they seek to act lawfully.
These reasons may be either conceptual or normative.
A. Conceptual Arguments
Conceptual arguments trade on the nature of the practice in which people
are engaged, when they claim to be asserting claims of legal entitlement.
Daniel Markovits puts the point nicely in his contribution to this
Symposium: When citizens seek to "transform[] brute demands into
assertions of right,"'57 they are committed to a certain pattern of explanation
and justification. As noted above, the hermeneutic point of view is
available to observers of the legal system, who may seek to understand the
content of law without thereby committing themselves to the attitude that
the state of affairs commanded by law ought to be brought about.58 But
once one moves from the status of observer to that of participant, that is,
one who seeks to assert a claim of right rather than merely a brute demand,
one is thereby committed to viewing the law from the internal point of
view. If the law is to make a difference in virtue of its legality, then citizens
and officials alike must regard themselves as bound by the law. 59 The
crucial volitional aspect of legal obligation is the act of willing one's
behavior to be law-governed. By opting in to a social practice, an agent
signifies her willingness to be guided by the regulative standards of that
practice. The move from the hermeneutic point of view to the internal point
of view accompanies the (metaphorical) act of putting on judge's robes, but
it can also accompany the (again, metaphorical) act of a citizen consulting a
statute book to see whether a proposed action is lawful.
the Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 158, 169 (Steven J.
Burton ed., 2000) [hereinafter The Path of the Law and Its Influence] (noting that Hart
"maintains that the only persons who must be regarded as having adopted the [internal] point
of view are judges" and calling this a "minor embarrassment" to his position).
56. See Hart, supra note 3, at 137-38 ("[I]t cannot be doubted that ... in relation to some
spheres of conduct in a modem state individuals do exhibit the whole range of conduct and
attitudes which we have called the internal point of view. ... [T]hey look upon [the law] as
a legal standard of conduct, refer to it in criticizing others, or in justifying demands, and in
admitting criticism and demands made by others.").
57. Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 1367, 1385 (2006).
58. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
59. Coleman, supra note 45, at 122.
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There is an interesting metaethical point lurking here, namely whether
Hart's theory of practical easoning is an expressivist one, along the lines of
non-cognitivist ethical theories developed by Allan Gibbard, Simon
Blackburn, and others. 60 An expressivist would maintain that making an
evaluation within a particular domain necessarily commits the agent to
having a reason to act according to the assessment.6 1 These evaluations are
not expressions of factual beliefs (hence the term "non-cognitivism");
rather, they express the agent's attitudes toward some state of affairs, that it
is a good or bad thing, that it should be promoted or resisted, and so on.
These attitudes are not purely subjective. Rather, an agent's attitude (say,
of endorsement of some state of affairs) is implicitly revisable if it turns out
not to be shared by others. Attitudes must be warranted or justifiable, not
merely asserted. As Blackburn puts it, our motivational structures have
internalized the critical gaze of others. 62 Thus, when either an official or a
citizen says "the law requires [or permits, or forbids] X," the speaker has in
effect said that she accepts the rule of recognition containing criteria
picking out reasons that X is required, permitted, or forbidden, and that as a
matter of fact the rule of recognition is accepted and followed by other
members of the legal community.63 In this way, the volitional act of
appealing to the discourse of legality as an explanatory and justificatory
practice binds the actor to the normativity of law.
To tie the conceptual arguments together, the possibility of a judge
regarding the rule of recognition as non-obligatory is incoherent, in the
same way that it would be impossible to imagine an actual basketball player
who did not accept that the rule prohibiting double dribbling imposed valid
obligations on him. Actually participating in a meaningful, purposive
social practice, as opposed to dressing up and pretending to participate in it,
requires accepting as mandatory the standards that regulate the practice. 64
60. See Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passibns (1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt
Feelings (1990); Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics: Some Trends, 101
Phil. Rev. 115, 144-52 (1992) (providing a brief but cogent overview of non-cognitivism and
its shortcomings).
61. See Toh, supra note 31, at 79.
62. Blackburn, supra note 60, at 207.
63. See Toh, supra note 3 1, at 87-88 (reconstructing Hart's analysis of legal statements
in this way).
64. Consider as an analogy here Saul Kripke's "sceptical solution" to the problem that
mental states do not determine the meaning of an utterance. See Saul A. Kripke,
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 101 (1982). We can say whether someone
correctly followed a rule-such as a mathematical operation or a rule of grammar-only if
we "widen our gaze from consideration of the rule follower alone and allow ourselves to
consider him as interacting with a wider community." Id. at 89. The community's standards,
in turn, are given in a teleological fashion as I have been suggesting. The conditions under
which a community will say a member has correctly grasped a rule depend on "what role and
utility in our lives can be ascribed to the practice of making this type of utterance under such
conditions." Id. at 92. Kripke's point is that normativity is built into all practices, including
those that seem to be reducible to private mental states alone. The implication for a theory
of law is that a person cannot claim to be acting lawfully without regard to how members of
the relevant community of law-interpreters would judge his behavior.
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Although they participate in a different way, citizens and judges may both
opt in to a framework of obligations that structures their activities as law-
respecting. So, for a citizen, it is also incoherent to regard the rule of
recognition (although she probably would not put it in these terms) as
imposing no obligation, at least insofar as the citizen purports to be acting
lawfully. A truly bad citizen-i.e., a criminal-may not care about the law,
but the attitude of seeking to act lawfully necessarily entails acceptance of
the normative standards that define lawful action, including the rule of
recognition that differentiates between nonlegal and legal sources of
reasons for action. Similarly, we may not be able to persuade someone to
care about the law or its purposes, but to the extent someone does care
enough to invoke the explanatory discourse of law, she is thereby
committed to regarding the law as a reason for action as such, and not
merely as a useful heuristic for predicting when sanctions will be imposed.
The sanction-avoiding, Holmesian bad man attitude does not differentiate
between the law and any other exercise of power. Undoubtedly people care
about avoiding the bads that can be inflicted on them by those in power, but
it is impossible to identify a specific social practice of law-following if one
has only the limited conceptual resources of sanction avoidance to explain
action.
A brief example will illustrate the distinction between obligation and
motivation, and also the point that the reasons to take the internal point of
view may not be moral reasons. 65 In his review of Roger Shiner's Norm
and Nature, Frederick Schauer offers a hypothetical of a jurisdiction's law
containing an anachronistic prohibition on public dancing, which is
enthusiastically supported by a highly vocal minority which vigorously
lobbies against its repeal, and therefore cannot be said to have fallen into
desuetude. 66 Modifying Schauer's hypothetical slightly, suppose a citizen
wishes to hold an outdoor dance party, and consults a lawyer to see if there
are any legal impediments to doing so. The citizen probably thought he
would be required to satisfy some liquor-licensing or zoning requirement,
and was surprised to be told by the lawyer about the anti-dancing statute.
How does the statute affect the citizen's practical reasoning? A variety of
motives potentially enters into his deliberation: the desire to avoid penalties
or the hassle and burden of defending a criminal charge, the wish not to be
thought by his neighbors as a scofflaw, the general disposition not to violate
the law, or even a more complex cost-benefit calculation that takes into
account the disutility associated with lawbreaking and the advantages of
having the party. Moreover, as a matter of morality, the citizen thinks there
is nothing at all wrong with dance parties, so he perceives no independent
moral obligation to do what the law requires. Schauer insists that it is not a
conceptual truth that the citizen and the lawyer must have internalized the
65. On the latter point, see Gerald J. Postema, The Normativity of Law, in Issues in
Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart 81, 87-88 (Ruth Gavison
ed., 1987).
66. Schauer, supra note 1, at 499-501.
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law or concluded that there is a moral obligation not to hold the dance
party.67 But Hart's position is that the law creates obligations, not that it
creates moral obligations. He clearly states that "there can be legal rights
and duties which have no moral justification or force whatever. ' '68 The
anti-dancing statute creates obligations, but in a different normative domain
from that of morality. A citizen can quite reasonably believe that he has no
moral obligation to refrain from public dancing while acknowledging that
he has other kinds of obligations, including legal obligations.
B. Normative Arguments
An interesting debate between Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro suggests
that the issue of whether the internal point of view is mandatory for citizens
cannot be resolved by conceptual analysis alone.69 The good citizen, who
accepts that the law imposes obligations, and the bad citizen, who is
concerned only with avoiding sanctions, both reason from an internal point
of view-it is not the case, however, that there is only one perspective
which can be called the internal point of view.70 As Perry helpfully
analyzes it, the distinction between external and internal perspectives maps
onto the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. 71 The
external perspective is that of an observer who is interested in formulating
and testing behavioral generalizations; it belongs to the domain of
theoretical reasoning. The internal perspective, by contrast, is that of
someone who is deciding what to do on the basis of both prudential and
non-prudential reasons. In Perry's view, the distinction between prudential
and non-prudential reasons is actually at the heart of the opposition between
Hart and Holmes. A Holmesian bad man is engaged in practical reasoning,
and regards the law as a source of reasons, but the only (law-created) reason
he cares about is the self-interested consideration of avoiding penalties.
The law is reason-giving for both the good and bad citizen; the only
difference is that they respond to different kinds of reasons. 72 If the bad
citizen is also viewing the law from an internal point of view, albeit one
which responds only to a subset of the reasons brought into existence by a
legal system, then the conceptual connection between acting within the
domain of law and viewing the law as legitimate is broken. There is no
conceptual reason why a citizen may not regard the law only instrumentally,
as a source of unpleasant consequences but not as imposing obligations that
create non-prudential reasons for action.
67. See id. at 501, 504-05.
68. Hart, supra note 3, at 268.
69. See Perry, supra note 55; Scott J. Shapiro, The Bad Man and the Internal Point of
View, in The Path of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 55, at 197.
70. Shapiro, supra note 69, at 198.
71. Perry, supra note 55, at 164-65.
72. Id. at 165-66.
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Two different types of citizens-the bad man and the "puzzled" man (to
use Hart's term73)-both may view the law from an internal point of view.
Perry's important critique of Hart, which he has developed in a series of
articles, is that any theory of law that turns on whether to privilege the
perspective of the bad man or the puzzled man cannot, by nature, belong to
the class of methodologically positivist legal theories, although they can be
used to defend a substantive thesis about the relationship between law and
morality.74 Both the bad man and the puzzled man are engaged in genuine
practical reasoning with reference to law; the only difference is that the bad
man's practical reason is affected only by the sanctions attached to the
violation of law. 75 Unless Hart is claiming that there are so few bad men
that they can be regarded as marginal to the theoretical enterprise, he
appears to be grounding a theory of law on an empirically contingent
attitude that citizens may take toward the law or a contestable theory of
human nature. 76 It is not the case that, conceptually speaking, there is no
such thing as a bad man or a bad man's internal point of view. Thus, Hart
must be arguing that one ought to adopt the puzzled citizen's internal point
of view because great social good would be made possible if most citizens
did view the law from that perspective. It does not help to fall back on
functional theories of the nature of law, such as Hart's claim that the role of
law is to "provid[e] guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of
such conduct. ' 77 Functional arguments are contestable as well, and one
who advances a functional theory is implicitly making a value judgment
that a particular kind of rule-governed society would be a good thing.
In response, Shapiro observes that Hart did not claim that the law
provided guidance simpliciter to human conduct; rather, he insisted that law
is distinct from other forms of social control of behavior in that it provides
guidance through rules.78 (Or, one might .say, through law, to avoid
distractions like the rules/principles distinction pressed by Dworkin or the
rules/standards dichotomy familiar in legal theory.) Recall that the internal
aspect of rules is first introduced in the discussion of a population with a
habit of obedience to a sovereign. 79 Habit alone does not make this
behavior lawful, however, unless the population (or most citizens, most of
the time) regards their habit as normative, as establishing the basis for
73. See Hart, supra note 3, at 40 ("Why should not law be equally if not more concerned
with the 'puzzled man' or 'ignorant man' who is willing to do what is required, if only he
can be told what it is?").
74. See Perry, supra note 16; Perry, supra note 55, at 169; Stephen R. Perry,
Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in Law and Interpretation 97 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995); Stephen R. Perry, The Varieties of Legal Positivism, 9 Can. J. L. &
Jurisprudence 361 (1996) (reviewing W.J. Waluchow, Critical Notice: Inclusive Legal
Positivism (1994)).
75. Shapiro, supra note 69, at 201-02 (summarizing Perry's critique); see Schauer, supra
note 1, at 500-01 (making a similar argument).
76. See Perry, supra note 55, at 169-74; Schauer, supra note 1, at 501-02.
77. Hart, supra note 3, at 249.
78. Shapiro, supra note 69, at 206.
79. Hart, supra note 3, at 54-55.
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justified criticism of deviation.80 Hart's criticism of the Holmesian bad
man, predictive theory of law is that it cannot account for the perspective of
the good or puzzled citizen. However, this argument is susceptible to
Perry's rebuttal that Hart has established only that the good and the bad
citizen are both conceptually compatible with Hart's theory of law.
Nothing in Hart's theory eliminates the possible existence of bad citizens,
and Hart would appear to beg the question against Holmes by privileging
one type of citizen's practical reasoning over the other's. 81 As Shapiro
points out, however, Hart's conception of guidance through rules is fairly
thin. 82 He is not trying to smuggle in a motivational component, or to claim
that the understanding of a legal obligation necessarily is accompanied by a
motivation to conform to the law. This much is clear from the possibility of
making detached normative statements about the law. And, as I argued
previously in connection with the expressivist reading of Hart, 83 citizens
can commit themselves to viewing the law from the internal point of view
to the extent they seek to justify their actions as having been law-respecting.
We are still one step short of establishing that the internal point of view
is mandatory. I have argued that when one opts in to a social practice, one
necessarily accepts the authority of that practice's norms. But opting in is
at best a hypothetical imperative. If one wishes to take advantage of a
certain kind of justification for one's actions (i.e., "I followed the law"),
then one is committed to viewing the law in a particular way. The last step
in this argument is normative, and requires moral reasons for constructing a
legal system in a society and for regarding the resulting system as
authoritative over particular domains of practical activity. The question
therefore becomes whether guiding conduct through rules is a worthy
endeavor for the law to pursue, 84 and further whether this worth gives
reasons that individual citizens ought to regard the law as legitimate. One
possible response from a moral point of view, which I have defended
elsewhere, 85 relies on the shared interest of citizens in living together with
others, and realizing the benefits of shared cooperative activity, despite
deep and persistent first-order moral disagreement. The normative force of
the law is thus given in terms of its capacity to solve a practical problem
facing people in the "circumstances of politics. '8 6  Hart hints at this
80. See id. at 55-57.
81. See Coleman, supra note 45, at 110-11 (emphasizing that Hart does not make a
normative argument for privileging the good citizen's point of view); Schauer, supra note 1,
at 503 ("To define law as normative is thus question-begging in a way that defining law
without reference to normativity, and then asking whether law is normative, is not.").
82. Shapiro, supra note 69, at 207.
83. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
84. See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 199.
85. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (2004).
86. See William J. FitzPatrick, The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's
Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity, 115 Ethics 651, 657-58 (2005).
The term "circumstances of politics" is from Jeremy Waldron, and refers to the condition of
coexisting with others with whom we do not share beliefs about the good, justice, or rights.
See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 105 (1999).
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approach when he says that the importance of legal rules is connected with
the belief that they are "necessary to the maintenance of social life or some
highly prized feature of it."'87 Jules Coleman's reading of Hart underscores
the utility of the internal point of view in sustaining a public sense of
reciprocity and a norm against free riding on the compliance of others:
"Stability, reciprocity, and mutuality of expectation are created and
enhanced by the behaviour exhibited by those accepting a rule from the
internal point of view." 88
The values associated with law are not only social goods, but appeal to
the interests of individuals as well, who seek to live and work with others
with whom they may have intractable moral disagreements. A person could
deny that she has any interest in regulating her activities according to rules
that are adopted in the name of society as a whole, but this would be a
strikingly disrespectful attitude to adopt toward one's fellow citizens.8 9
One might also believe that normative disputes in the public domain are not
in good faith, but are merely struggles for advantage and the realization of
one's interests. On the other hand, this may be a cynical exaggeration,
ignoring the possibility that participation in politics may be motivated by
more high-minded concerns. 90 Although the motives and attitudes shared
by citizens is a contingent, empirical matter, I believe a theory of
professional ethics can put these issues aside, just as Hart differentiated the
questions of obligation and motivation. Although I have followed Jeremy
Waldron in talking about citizens having a "felt need, shared by the
disputants, for common action in spite of such disagreement," 9 1 it may be
better to put the point in terms of the necessary existence of an interest in
social settlement of normative conflict, merely by virtue of the nature of
human beings as sociable, disputatious creatures. 92  Notably, this
conception of the interest in settlement of normative conflict is compatible
with a society full of either puzzled men or bad men. The normative
reasons to take the internal perspective are the same under the assumption
of either Holmes's exceedingly bleak view of human nature9 3 or a
conception that builds in the possibility of altruism.
I have defended an account of the authority of law, drawn from Waldron
and Raz, which builds on the shared interest in reaching at least provisional
agreement on a common course of action, even where there is persistent and
87. Hart, supra note 3, at 87.
88. Coleman, supra note 45, at 120.
89. See Waldron, supra note 86, at 221-22.
90. Id. at 230.
91. Id. at 207 (emphasis added); see also Wendel, supra note 85, at 376.
92. I have called this postulate the "Grotian problematic," picking up on J.B.
Schneewind's use of Hugo Grotius's conception of human nature to organize his discussion
of the history of modem moral philosophy. See J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of
Autonomy 70-73 (1998).
93. See Perry, supra note 55, at 172-76.
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deep moral disagreement. 94 Generalizing from one of Raz's illustrations,
society can be likened to two merchants who have gotten into a dispute over
some term in a contract, but who still desire to continue the mutually
beneficial commercial relationship.95 The parties decide to submit the
dispute to an arbitrator and accept the arbitrator's decision as binding,
regardless of its content (i.e., regardless of whether each party believes the
arbitrator got it right). The parties share a reason, namely the desire for a
continued relationship, for regarding the arbitrator's decision as an
authoritative directive in their practical reasoning. This shared interest
creates a second-order reason not to act on what would otherwise be reasons
for the parties to contest the decision. Significantly, although the
arbitrator's decision is based on reasons that would otherwise apply to the
parties' situation (e.g., whether the contract had been adequately performed
or whether delivered goods were conforming), the decision creates a
content-independent reason for action.96 After the decision is handed
down, the merchants' practical reasoning will take the decision into account
because it is the arbitrator's decision, not because it appears correct to them.
Using the arbitrator example as a metaphor, we can imagine citizens
concluding that they would like to work together with their fellows to
achieve various public goods-roads, parks, hospitals, schools, clean air,
protection against crime, national defense, and so on-which would be
impossible to realize without coordinated action. Moreover, in the course
of cooperative activity, citizens realize that moral disputes may arise-
whether state-funded hospitals should perform abortions, whether young
people should be conscripted into military service, how much of a burden
should be imposed on industry to reduce air pollution, and so on. Because
deliberation, even in good faith, cannot finally resolve all of these issues,
there is a shared need for a procedural mechanism to resolve and settle
them. Legal norms are content-independent reasons for action, like the
arbitrator's decision, in that citizens are obligated to respect the law
regardless of whether they believe it is morally well founded.97 If each
94. See Wendel, supra note 85; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67 (2005). Although I have tended to talk about the
coordination function of law in terms of settling normative conflict, the law has a role in
coordinating activity even in the absence of normative disagreement. See Larry Alexander &
Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law 11-15
(2001). For example, there may be general agreement that issuers of securities should
disclose information relating to the issuer's financial condition, but in the absence of binding
legal rules, the content and form of the disclosures would probably vary to a degree that
would undermine the efficiency of the securities markets.
95. See Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 46, at 41-42.
96. Id. at 35. In later work Hart also referred to the content-independence of legal norms
as essential to the authority of law. See H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal
Reasons, in Essays on Bentham 243, 243 (1982).
97. Thus, I disagree with those who regard the authority of law as primarily epistemic-
that is, seeing its function as providing better, more reliable guidance to what morally ought
to be done. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities
and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation, supra note 74, at 360. A great
2006] 1491
FORDHAM LA W RE VIEW
citizen could reexamine the moral basis for applicable legal norms, the law
would be unable to perform its function of enabling cooperative action in a
pluralistic society. This is the basis for the law's claim to legitimate
authority, and its preclusive effect on the deliberation of citizens.
III. THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW FOR LAWYERS
The,. objectivity of law is just as important as a constraint on the
deliberation of lawyers, who advise clients on the extent of their legal rights
and duties and structure transactions within the law. One of the recurring
theoretical problems in legal ethics is how to reconcile the moral agency of
lawyers-who are of course humans, subject to moral demands even when
acting in a professional capacity 98-with the duty of lawyers to facilitate
access by citizens to legal entitlements. In Stephen Pepper's well-known
phrase, if lawyers based their advice on their own moral beliefs, the result
would be an "oligarchy of lawyers," not a democracy. 99 In Hart's theory,
secondary rules of change allow citizens to modify the law to adapt to
changing circumstances,100 and in a democracy, these secondary rules
specify ways in which citizens may participate in the process of collective
self-government. If the rules were modified by unelected officials or some
other agents who function as intermediaries between citizens and their legal
entitlements, the democratic nature of secondary rules of change would be
undercut. This concern is reflected in the law governing lawyers, which
permits lawyers to give nonlegal advice,' 0 ' but reserves to clients the right
many normative controversies implicate conflicting values, conceptions of "the good,"
virtues, or ideals which cannot always be reconciled in terms of some more general
conception of "the good" or the telos for humans. See, e.g., Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of
Moral Complexity (1987); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 54-58 (1996); Raz, Morality of
Freedom, supra note 46, at 322-66; W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good 19-47 (1930); Isaiah
Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity 1 (Henry Hardy ed.,
1990); Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in Mortal Questions 128 (1979). Moral
pluralism, not uncertainty, is the foundation of much of the disagreement that gives rise to
the need for law. Of course, moral pluralism is not the whole story. Disagreement and the
need for settlement may also be the result of empirical uncertainty, limited altruism,
unreliable cognitive processes, and a host of other factors. Even in these cases, however, the
shared interest of citizens is simply that the law provide some focal point to enable
cooperation, not that the law get it right in first-order moral terms. A favorite maxim of
Justice Brandeis puts the point nicely: "[I]t is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724
(1865) ("It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should
be settled correctly.").
98. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 63 (1980); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
Hum. Rts. 1 (1975).
99. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 617.
100. Hart, supra note 3, at 92-93.
101. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 2.1 (2002) ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.").
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to determine the goals of the representation 10 2 and underscores that moral
blame for the client's goals should not be ascribed to the lawyer.103 As
long as the client's purpose is lawful, the lawyer has a fiduciary duty to
carry it out to the best of her ability, and although she is not precluded from
having a "moral conversation" with the client, the client is permitted to
insist that the lawyer pursue her lawful objectives. 10 4
If the internal perspective on the rule of recognition is mandatory for
judges because of considerations of objectivity and systematicity, it is
equally mandatory for lawyers. A lawyer must treat the law as imposing
obligations on the client, and because the lawyer's own duty is to represent
the client faithfully within the law, the law imposes obligations on the
lawyer as well. The opposite of the internal point of view manifests itself in
legal practice as the attitude that lawyers can, and should, treat the law
instrumentally, as merely an impediment to their clients' goals, rather than
as a source of obligation. This attitude valorizes "creative and aggressive"
structuring of transactions, "zealous" advocacy, and an excessively private
view of legal obligations that runs only to the client and does not include
obligations to courts, third parties, or a general obligation to interpret legal
texts in good faith. In other words, the distinction between the internal and
external perspective in jurisprudence shows up in practice in the guise of
controversies over interpretation.
Hart's theory of the nature of law focuses on the union of primary and
secondary rules and the possibility of taking an internal perspective on these
rules-that is, viewing them as intrinsically reason-giving. The theory of
legal authority I have defended emphasizes the function of law, which is the
settlement of normative conflict. One who desires to live peaceably
alongside, and cooperate with, one's fellow citizens has a reason to respect
the settlement by law of the normative controversies that would otherwise
make cooperation impossible, or at least too costly. Even in the absence of
normative conflict, one has an interest in coordinating activities with a
minimum of inconvenience and cost. Therefore, one has a reason to opt
into the social practice of lawful action, which necessitates adopting the
internal point of view. As I have argued elsewhere, ethical constraints on
the process of interpretation are necessary to enable the law to fulfill its
function of optimizing people's ability to work together to achieve common
projects.' 0 5 The law would fail at this end in one of two situations: (1)
representatives of clients were unable to discern the content of the law, or
(2) quasi-private legal interpreters, i.e., lawyers, were permitted to
manipulate the formal expression of legal norms to make them mean
102. Id. R. 1.2(a).
103. Id. R. 1.2(b) ("A lawyer's representation of a client.., does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.").
104. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 1 ("Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by the
law and the lawyer's professional obligations.").
105. See Wendel, supra note 15, at 1193.
2006] 1493
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
anything at all.106 "If enacted law is to settle at least some cases at the level
of particularity at which they present themselves, a rule of recognition will
need to provide a basis for specifying not only which proposal, but which
version of a given proposal, has been enacted."' 107 As this framing of the
issue shows, there is a three-way relationship between a theory of the nature
of law, a theory of the basis for the law's authority, and the interpretation of
legal norms. 10 8 The task of this final substantive section of this essay is
therefore to explore this relationship and attempt to derive principles
regulating the interpretation of law from Hart's theory of the nature of law
and the theory I have defended of the authority of law.
Even among philosophers who emphasize the coordination and
settlement function of the law as the foundation for its authority, there is
considerable dispute over the implication for interpretation. Jeremy
Waldron inclines toward textualism, emphasizing that legislatures who hash
out and resolve normative disagreement consider and vote on the official
language of a statute, not committee reports or floor debates.l0 9 He does
not deny that the "plain meaning" of statutory language is often insufficient
to resolve questions concerning the application of the statute, but does
stress that statutory interpretation at least places considerably more
importance on the statutory text than common-law interpretation places on
the language of judicial opinions.1I0 Taking the need for interpreting
language as given, Larry Alexander contends that the task of interpretation
is primarily a matter of recovering the intent of the authors of legal texts.111
In his view, intent is what makes utterances meaningful, as distinct from
random collections of marks on the page. Lawmakers determine what
actions are required, permitted, prohibited, etc., and then communicate
those rules to citizens in the form of legal texts. When it comes time to
interpret legal texts, citizens must be engaging in the process of recovering
the authors' intentions, because the authors intended to communicate what
ought to be done. Finally, Heidi Hurd argues, in opposition to Alexander,
that it is the law which settles normative conflict, not the intentions of
lawmakers.11 2 When the lawmaker is a multimember legislative body, it is
practically a legal fiction to speak of a unitary intention underlying the
resulting text.11 3 Even if it were possible to recover the univocal intent of a
106. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 94, at 53 ("To perform their [settlement]
function[] effectively, Lex's rules must be determinate enough to avoid moral controversy in
the process of their application and general enough to settle questions that Lex cannot attend
to as they arise.").
107. Waldron, supra note 86, at 39.
108. See Alexander, supra note 97, at 358 ("Knowing how to interpret laws requires
knowing what laws are.... [M]any issues that are currently considered part of a theory of
legal interpretation are actually part of a theory of authority instead.").
109. Waldron, supra note 86, at 80-81.
110. Id. at 79.
111. See Alexander, supra note 97, at 361-63.
112. See Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in Law and Interpretation, supra note
74, at 405.
113. See Wendel, supra note 15, at 1189 n.68 (summarizing this criticism).
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legislature on a specific point, 114 however, it is not a necessary implication
that the intent should be conclusive of the meaning of the resulting law.
The argument for the primacy of intent in interpretation seeks to
generalize from the picture of a group of people who entrust the settlement
of controversy to a wise elder-"Let Lex decide," they resolve, believing
that Lex's decision will enable them to move beyond the controversy and
cooperate productively."15 In this way, Alexander and Sherwin's theory of
the authority of law parallels Raz's arbitrator example, considered
previously.116 Since Lex-the-human cannot actually resolve all the disputes
that arise in a large-scale society, this is obviously a metaphor for Lex-the-
law settling controversies by promulgating norms in the form of rules,
which speak generally to whole classes of disputes, rather than settling
them case-by-case. 117 But if Lex is only a metaphor, then he can have only
metaphorical intents with respect to particular controversies. An
intentionalist approach to interpretation would have to rely on
counterfactual intents, hypothesized intents deduced from the language and
apparent purpose of legislation, or something like the immanent rationality
of the law.1 8 These are all respectable theories of interpretation, but they
are qualitatively different from the process of interpreting an utterance by
ascertaining the intent of a human speaker.
The more fundamental distinction between my theory of legal authority
and that advanced by Hurd, Alexander, and Sherwin, is that they all believe
that the law has authority only insofar as it makes it more likely that
114. In Alexander's version of the "no vehicles in the park" example, a three-member
town council has the following intentions with respect to permitted vehicles: Member I
(permit A and B), Member 2 (permit B and C), Member 3 (permit B and D). Since all of the
members intended to permit B, an army truck sitting atop a war memorial, an intentionalist
interpretation of the ordinance would deem the truck as not falling within the prohibition of
vehicles in the park. See Alexander, supra note 97, at 357-58, 380-81. One obvious practical
difficulty with even an unrealistically simple example like this one is that in a real case, the
intentions of the council members must be ascertained at some temporal distance, probably
in the course of litigation. The members may have forgotten entirely what they had intended
with respect to war memorials, if they had thought about that issue at all, or the salience of
the issue at the present time might cause them to remember incorrectly what they had
intended in the past. Relying on contemporaneous notes to solve the problem of recollection
introduces a different problem-namely, that of the manipulability and unreliability of these
notes. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 441, 442 n.2 (1990) (citing numerous iterations of arguments against the use of
legislative history materials).
115. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 94, at 16. Lex is a device used by Alexander
and Sherwin to personify the authority of the law. In their story, Lex starts out as an actual
human decision maker who is appointed by society to resolve disputes. Lex becomes a
metaphor as these hypothetical citizens realize that no human can resolve all of the
controversies that will arise in society, so it would be advantageous to have a system of rules
in place to deal with cases in general terms.
116. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
117. Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 94, at 28-29.
118. See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review,
17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105 (1988).
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citizens will comply with the requirements of morality. Alexander and
Sherwin emphasize this point:
[W]e are interested in more than coordination. The controversies Lex
addresses can be settled in better or worse ways, and one of the benefits
the community seeks from his rules is avoidance of moral error through
the application of Lex's superior expertise. Members of the community
presumably have selected Lex because they have confidence in his moral
expertise.119
In Hurd's view, the law has authority only to the extent it directs citizens
to the action that is morally required: "[T]he intentions of lawmakers are,
on this view, a heuristic guide to determining the content of the law, which
is itself a heuristic guide to determining the content of morality.' 120
Because the law has authority only when it enables citizens to conform their
actions to the demands of morality, the law is relevant in practical reasoning
only where it is clear enough to be helpful in pointing people in the right
direction, morally speaking.
As a moral pluralist, I would reformulate this strong limitation on the
authority of law, 121 but the linkage between authority and interpretation is
the same. In my view, the law has authority when it enables citizens to
conform their actions to what citizens, collectively and in the name of
society, have agreed upon as the basis for cooperative action against a
background of persistent normative disagreement, and with the recognition
that even in the absence of disagreement there will be costs associated with
individuals going their own way without the coordination of binding rules.
Due to limitations inherent in the nature of language, however, it is
unrealistic to expect that law will be able to provide a single answer-let
alone one morally right answer-in cases that lie at the penumbra of a legal
rule, cases that implicate competing legal norms, and unforeseen
circumstances in application, perhaps resulting from changing technology
or social norms. 122 The best we can expect from law is that it articulate and
clarify our community's response to a certain category of disputes, and
provide resources for lawyers and judges to use in achieving settlement of
particular controversies. In any event, the crucial aspect of the law's claim
to authority, given the background of normative disagreement that gives
rise to the need for law, is that the law provide content-independent reasons
for action. That means the interpretation of law cannot be a function of
what citizens and lawyers think about the law, from a normative point of
view. As Raz observes,
Different members and different sections of a society may have different
views as to which schemes of co-operation, co-ordination, or forebearance
are appropriate. It is an essential part of the function of law in society to
119. Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 94, at 98-99.
120. See Hurd, supra note 112, at 425.
121. See Wendel, supra note 85, at 381 n.80.
122. See Hart, supra note 3, at 124-36.
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mark the point at which a private view of members of the society, or of
influential sections or powerful groups in it, ceases to be their private
view and becomes.., a view binding on all members notwithstanding
their disagreement with it.1 2 3
The fundamental flaw in the Holmesian bad man perspective on the law
is that it impermissibly privileges the views of individual citizens on the
question of what ought to be done pursuant to law. For example, consider
the view that corporate law and other legal restraints on self-interested
behavior merely set a price to engage in certain activities in the form of
sanctions for violating the law. 124 If corporate managers regarded law in
this way, the social goods of stability, reciprocity, and coordinated action
would be impossible to realize. Parties to contracts would defect whenever
they believed it was in their subjective advantage to do so, and regulators
would be unable to ensure compliance with mutually beneficial regulatory
norms where the affected citizens considered it advantageous to breach and
pay. The decision to buy one's way out of compliance would inevitably be
less structured and predictable than compliance because of the subjectivity
of utility and willingness (and ability) to pay. It is of course an axiom of
rational-choice theory that preferences are subjective, 12 5 so it is a
reasonable assumption that BadCorp might be willing to pay a $10,000 fine
in order to continue polluting, while GoodCorp might have a different rank
order of preferences that would determine the opposite outcome. But these
subjective utility functions are irrelevant to the correct interpretation of the
legal norms governing the activity in which the client wishes to engage.
Thus, acting on the basis of subjective preferences runs directly counter to
the settling and coordinating effect of the law. 126 Perhaps chaos would not
123. See Raz, supra note 11, at 50-5 1.
124. See Williams, supra note 9 (criticizing this conception of corporate law).
125. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 18 (3d ed. 2000).
126. At the San Diego faculty workshop, Michael Kelly raised an important and difficult
question in discussion, namely whether it is impossible for a legal system to consist entirely
of what Calabresi and Melamed would call liability rules. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). The point is quite well taken, that the Holmesian bad man
attitude essentially identifies the law with liability rules, which is another way of making
Stephen Perry's point that the bad citizen is a genuine practical reasoner, albeit one who
cares only about the sanction-creating aspect of legal norms. Liability rules do not protect an
entitlement absolutely; instead, they permit another to destroy the entitlement, provided he is
willing to pay an objectively determined price in order to do so. See id. at 1092. It seems
that I am arguing that the law, either conceptually must or normatively ought to, protect
entitlements only with property rules or inalienability rules. As Calabresi and Melamed
point out, there are good reasons to favor liability rules in some cases, such as where
mutually beneficial exchanges would not occur if a transfer depended on the entitlement
holder's consent. See id. at 1106-07. Liability rules have efficiency and administrability
advantages which make them useful in certain contexts. So, it would be much too strong a
position to claim that the law does not, and should not, make use of liability rules.
Conversely, it would probably not be a good thing for the law to consist entirely of liability
rules, for the reasons given by Calabresi and Melamed in favor of the other types of rules.
See, e.g., id. at 1111-12 (suggesting that an entitlement may be made inalienable if its
transfer creates externalities, or where there are moral reasons to prohibit certain transfers).
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result in a given case, but this argument is not an empirical conjecture about
whether cooperation would, in fact, fall apart. Rather, it is a flnctional
normative argument that the social goods which are the end of law provide
a justification for regarding oneself as obligated by the law. 127
When one is acting in the domain of law, it is essential that an
interpretation of legal norms be grounded in materials (texts, principles that
are fairly deemed to underlie and justify legal rules, interpretive practices,
hermeneutic methods, and so on) that are properly regarded in the relevant
community as appropriate reasons-what I have elsewhere called
(somewhat confusingly in the context of this discussion of Hart) internal
legal reasons. 128 The rule of lenity, the statute of limitations, the text of a
regulation, legislative history documents, the expressio unius canon of
statutory construction, the methodology of textualism, principles of
analogical reasoning, and the facts of cases are all internal legal reasons, in
that they are identified by the rule of recognition as reasons belonging to the
law and not some wholly extralegal domain such as morality. In most areas
of at least modest complexity, there is a multitude of internal legal reasons
that bear on any interesting interpretive question, and it is unlikely that
there will be only one obviously right answer. For this reason, legal
interpretation usually involves the exercise of judgment, or what some
scholars of statutory interpretation refer to as practical reasoning. 129
Judgment is not a faculty of individual interpreters, and is certainly not a
matter of punting the weighing or balancing of plural factors to the
subjective discretion of the decision maker. Rather, judgment is
fundamentally a community-bound virtue, in that it makes reference to
intersubjective criteria for the exercise and regulation of judgment. 130 An
Thus, although I suspect a legal system could not get by only with liability rules, this is a
normative position and not a conceptual one-a legal system could have a rule of
recognition that identified only liability rules as being within the domain of law.
127. Even if utter systemic breakdown does not occur, there may be bad consequences
associated with the Holmesian bad man point of view that should cut in favor of lawyers
taking the internal attitude of acceptance of law. For example, the securities and corporate
bar have complained vociferously about the high cost of regulation associated with the
Sarbanes-Oxley statute-costs that fall on the regulated industry. But the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act did not appear for no reason. It was a response to the failure by lawyers and accountants
to ensure compliance by their clients with existing securities laws. The history of the
accounting frauds at Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and other companies, and the
regulatory response by Congress and the SEC, suggests that there are reasons of long-term
self-interest that should motivate lawyers to take the internal point of view. This picture of
the motivational effect of law resembles David Gauthier's account of the foundations of
morality in "constrained maximization" by self-interested actors. See David Gauthier,
Morals by Agreement (1986).
128. See Wendel, supra note 15, at 1197.
129. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533 (1992).
130. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982);
Gerald L. Postema, "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 L. & Phil. 283
(1987).
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interpreter's discretion is constrained by community norms that govern the
understanding and application of legal texts to factual situations. The
community's shared acceptance of certain reasons as relevant to legal
decisions therefore delimits the boundary separating internal legal reasons
from the considerations that are irrelevant to legal interpretation.
One may question whether this is enough for coordination and
settlement, particularly if internal legal reasons can be plural and
conflicting. There still seems to be a subjective element in interpretation if
it is thrown back on judgment, which is a virtue or characteristic of a judge
or lawyer, not a property of the law itself. Again, however, the response is
to emphasize that a community of interpreters constrains the exercise of
judgment and elaborates principles regulating interpretation. These
communities do a pretty good job differentiating between good faith
resolutions of competing legal norms and "creative and aggressive"
manipulation of legal texts and the exploitation of loopholes. In the end,
the persuasiveness of this position depends on whether it offers a plausible
account of how communities actually do elaborate standards that constrain
the interpretation of legal texts, and whether the constitutive and regulative
rules of these practices further the ability of practitioners to realize the end
or purpose of the practice. I have had more to say elsewhere about the
problem of competing interpretive communities, specifically of the
phenomenon of a "tax bar" and a "tax shelter bar," with diametrically
opposed interpretive attitudes toward the Internal Revenue Code.131 There
may be genuine, good-faith disagreement among practitioners about how to
interpret legal norms. This is to be expected, and may even be a healthy
way to ensure flexibility and equity within the legal system. But we should
not infer from the potential diversity of good-faith interpretations that any
community can come along and announce itself as a legitimate authority
regulating interpretation. Some communities may not be committed to
regarding the law as a public good and a social achievement that deserves to
be maintained and respected, as opposed to struggled against. Thus, the
broad normative implication of the internal point of view is that interpretive
primacy should be vested in those communities of professionals who
manifest an attitude of custodianship toward the law.
131. See Wendel, supra note 15, at 1215-17.
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